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Abstract 
 
The view that the wrong of defamation protects the interest in reputation, and nothing but that 
interest, is ordinarily taken for granted in modern English law. It is, however, incorrect. This 
paper gives four examples of ways in which the English law of defamation has strayed into 
the protection of other interests, in particular privacy, self-worth and wealth. They are: the 
supplementary tests of defamatoriness (the ridicule test and the ‘shun and avoid’ test); s. 8(5) 
of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974; the rule that slanders are not ordinarily 
actionable without proof of ‘special damage’; and, finally, the compensation of losses 
consequential upon the injury to reputation. It is argued that these are all unwarranted and 
ought to be reformed.  
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DEFAMATION OUTSIDE REPUTATION: 
PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF ENGLISH LAW 
 
Eric Descheemaeker* 
 
I Introduction 
 
[133] This paper starts with one premise and draws four conclusions from it in terms of 
suggested changes to the English law of defamation.
1,2 
The premise is that defamation, as a 
wrong, exists to protect the plaintiff’s interest in his reputation—‘reputation’ being used in 
this context as an ellipsis for deserved reputation. The consequences the law should draw 
from this proposition are that: (a) two of the tests currently used by courts to determine the 
defamatory character of the words—or, generally, statement—complained of ought to be 
abolished; (b) s. 8(5) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 should likewise be 
repealed; (c) the condition that most defamatory statements made in transient form are not 
actionable unless accompanied by ‘special loss’ (slanders not actionable per se) ought to be 
removed; and (d) the law of defamation should stop compensating losses other than injuries 
to reputation which flow from such injury. All four proposals, it is argued, stem directly and 
as a matter of logic from the acceptance of the above premise.  
 
II  The Premise 
 
The examination of the premise starts with a brief exploration of the taxonomy of the law of 
wrongs (or civil liability).
3
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 I refer to two of my previous works under the following abbreviations: DW = E. Descheemaeker, The 
Division of Wrongs: A Historical Comparative Study (Oxford, 2009); PR = E. Descheemaeker, ‘Protecting 
Reputation: Defamation and Negligence’, 29 OJLS (2009), 603. 
1
 Only the civil, not criminal, law of defamation will be considered. The two provinces of the law are 
analytically distinct and, because they pursue different goals, it is not clear that much can be learnt for the civil 
law of defamation from its criminal counterpart. This is not to deny that, historically, it has been significantly 
influenced by it.  
2
 In this paper, ‘defamation’ will be understood as the reunion of the two causes of action historically 
known as ‘libel’ and ‘slander’. 
3
 On these two categories—one using the vantage point of the common law and the other of the civilian 
tradition—and how they relate to one another, see DW, chap. 2. 
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The Taxonomy of the Law of Wrongs 
 
The mapping of the law of wrongs along the lines of protected interests,
4
 which—even 
though arguably present—remained implicit in Roman law, was an intellectual breakthrough 
for which Donellus (Hugues Doneau, 1527—91) and then Grotius (Hugo de Groot, 1583—
1645) must be credited.
5
 This classification was shortly imported into the common-law 
tradition as a means of [134] expositing the law of wrongs, in particular by Blackstone and 
Hale;
6
 but English law never operated the task, which Donellus and Grotius had carried out in 
respect of Roman law, of mapping out the various forms of action—which were structuring 
it—onto these different interests, and the different degrees of blameworthiness (or lack 
thereof) at which each would be protected. This failure, which was never rectified—not even 
when the forms of action were abolished—is allegedly one of the principal reasons why the 
English law of wrongs has remained bogged down in deep analytical muddle to the present 
day. 
 
The Interest in Reputation 
 
One of the protected interests identified by these authors was reputation (called ‘existimatio’ 
by Donellus, ‘fama’, ‘honor’ or ‘eer’ by Grotius, and ‘reputation’ by Hale and Blackstone).7 
At its simplest, reputation consists in the good esteem in which others hold us. The 
corresponding interest could, in principle, be protected through a number of different 
mediums, whether specifically geared at this purpose or not. In the context of English law, 
there is intuitively a very strong correlation between reputation as an interest and the cause or 
causes of action known as ‘defamation’ (or, alternatively, ‘slander’ and ‘libel’). The strength 
of this correlation is such that it is almost invariably assumed in the modern common-law 
tradition that the bijection between these two legal categories is perfect. Surjectively, Dr 
McNamara has shown that the view that defamation protects reputation—and, we should 
                                                 
4
 On the notion of an interest, see DW, 27-8; PR, 605-6. 
5
 DW, 219-21.  
6
 DW, 221-4. 
7
 PR, 609.  
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specify, nothing but it—has become ‘axiomatic’ in English cases and literature.8 Injectively, 
it is typically assumed that no other cause of action protects reputation—and, in particular, 
not the transversal wrong of negligence.
9
  
 The danger with propositions which are intuitively plausible but are not in fact 
carefully examined is that they often turn out, on closer examination, to be no more than a 
rough approximation of the truth. So it is with the bijection between defamation and 
reputation. It is typically believed to be true; and it ought in my mind to be true; but it is not 
in fact quite true. This has consequences in terms of the intelligibility and clarity of the law. 
 Ignoring the protection of reputation through other causes of action,
10
 I shall in this 
paper give four examples of the way in which the English law of defamation has historically 
been stretched beyond its natural boundaries—the protection of (deserved) reputation—to 
protect other interests, thus becoming in a certain way similar to the wrong of iniuria in 
Roman law; and I shall argue that this is unwarranted and ought to be undone.  
 
III Defamation and Self-worth: the First Supplementary Test of Defamatoriness 
 
Modern English law uses three different (and alternative) tests to determine what counts as 
‘defamatory’ for the purposes of the law of defamation. The leading test is that expounded in 
its modern form by Lord Atkin in Sim v Stretch, that the words would ‘tend to lower the 
plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally’.11 This is not 
problematic.  
 
The Ridicule Test 
 
There are, however, two supplementary tests which are, for their part, unjustifiable. The first 
one is the so-called ‘ridicule’ test (traced by Dr McNamara back to Mason v Jennings):12 
                                                 
8
 L. McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford, 2007), 1. The proposition that ‘defamation’ is 
identical with ‘the protection that the common law affords to the interest in reputation’ is also taken as a starting 
point by the American Restatement of Torts (American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Second): Torts 
2d, vol. 3 (St. Paul [Minn.], 1977), 151). 
9
 PR, 619-22. 
10
 PR, 618-9. 
11
 [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240. 
12
 [1680] Raym Sir T 401, 83 ER 209.  
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[135] a statement will be regarded as defamatory if it exposes the plaintiff to ridicule.
13
 A 
fundamental problem with this test is that it cannot be said to protect the plaintiff’s 
reputation. It might well be wrong to subject others to words which ridicule or abase them; 
but this cannot meaningfully be regarded as defamatory. Pointing out that a film director is 
‘hideous-looking’14 might be humiliating to him, and injure his self-esteem; but it does not 
affect his worth, or reputation, in the eyes of others. Here, the wrong of defamation is being 
used—or, rather, abused—to protect self-worth. Ulpian famously stated, in respect of the 
Roman law of iniuria, that the wrong could protect either corpus (physical integrity), fama 
(good name, reputation, fame, renown) or dignitas (dignity, worth, status, standing).
15
 To 
follow the parallel, English defamation is being stretched here to protect, at least in part, the 
dignitary section of iniuria. It is not meant to.
16
 Because it does not belong there, the ridicule 
test ought to be abolished from the law of defamation.
17
  
 
IV Defamation and Privacy: the Second Supplementary Test of Defamatoriness and the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
 
Defamation, as a cause of action, has also been allowed to extend its scope of protection to 
another interest, which is privacy. Privacy—famously described by Warren and Brandeis 
(following Cooley) as the right ‘to be let alone’,18 and which might be more specifically 
defined as the right to control selectively the flow to others of information about oneself—is 
another aspect of the dignitas interest identified by Ulpian.
19
 Historically, as is well known, 
English law has had no cause of action to directly protect privacy. This does not mean that 
there was no such protection; but the actionability of acts (whether words or not) which 
unjustifiably violated the plaintiff’s privacy was always oblique, through causes of action 
which did not explicitly aim at protecting that interest. One of them was breach of 
                                                 
13
 L. McNamara, op. cit. (n. 8), chap. 7. Contra J. Burchell, ‘The Criteria of Defamation’, 91 SALJ 
(1974), 178, 196-7. 
14
 Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008, 1010 (CA). 
15
 D.47.10.1.2 (Ulpian, 56 Edict). 
16
 This proposition stems logically from the above premise. It was explicitly recognised by the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission: NSWLRC, Defamation (Report 11) (Sydney, 1971), § 5. 
17
 On the question whether ridiculing words should be actionable through a different cause of action, 
see below, section 3. 
18
 S. D. Warren and L. D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, 4 Harvard L. R. (1890-91), 193, 195. On 
the distinction between privacy and related interests, see J. Neethling, ‘The Concept of Privacy in South African 
Law’, 122 SALJ (2005), 18, 19ff.  
19
 Above, n. 15. 
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confidence. Another was malicious falsehood.
20
 A third was defamation. Sometimes, this was 
done by stretching the general test of defamatoriness to—or beyond—its breaking point;21 
but, even though this point is the one most commonly brought up in this context,  I will leave 
it aside because it is concerned with the wrong application of the (right) law of defamation, 
rather than any defect intrinsic to the law itself. I will, instead, give two examples of the way 
in which the law of defamation has gone wrong, on the face of the record, because of an 
unwarranted drift into the protection of privacy. 
 
The ‘Shun and Avoid’ Test 
 
The first one concerns the second supplementary test of defamatoriness devised by the courts, 
namely, the ‘shun and avoid’ test.22 It is under this test that the imputation of such things as 
shameful diseases or insanity can be actioned in defamation. The problem here is the same as 
in the previous section, namely, that the actionability of the words is not grounded in any 
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation. If there is anything wrong with trumpeting forth, without 
justification, sensitive facts about another, it would be because such an act violates the 
claimant’s privacy, not his reputation—in Ulpian’s terms, again, their dignitas not their fama. 
This is another example of the way in which, to a certain extent, the English law of 
defamation has transformed itself into a common-law-style actio iniuriarum.  
 
[136] Response to an Objection 
 
At this point, an objection that could immediately be raised is: does it matter? Even if we do 
accept that defamation properly exists for, and only for, the protection of reputation, is it not 
pedantic at best, in a post-formulary age, to insist on the use of the ‘right’ cause of action? 
What would, after all, be wrong with defamation filling in the gaps left by the absence of 
direct protection of dignitary interests in English law?  
 The answer is that it does matter, for either of two reasons. When non-reputational 
considerations are smuggled into a cause of action, defamation, meant to be protecting 
reputation, one of two things happens. The first possibility is that protection will be granted 
                                                 
20
 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (CA). 
21
 Tolley v JS Fry & Sons [1930] 1 KB 467. 
22
 L. McNamara, op. cit. (n. 8), chap. 6. 
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which ought not to be. That reputation founded in character deserves to be protected—which 
is not to say that it could never be justifiably infringed—is self-evident; if challenged to give 
an account, the law would easily be able to explain why it does take such a course of action. 
But whether self-worth, for example, ought to be protected is much less obvious. This paper 
is not the place to answer the question; but the point can validly, and should, be raised. My 
position here would be that self-worth does not deserve, as such, to be protected; but it is 
right to render actionable such ridiculing words when they become harassing.
23
 If this is true, 
then the use of the ridicule test amounts to giving self-worth a free ride in the reputational 
carriage, granting it protection under the law without requiring it to make its own separate 
case. 
 The second possibility is that the non-reputational (in this case, dignitary) interest 
does in fact deserve protection. Even in this case, it is at least possible that the use of the 
wrong cause of action will have unsatisfactory consequences. Some of these consequences 
might be indirect. For example, by allowing some bits of breach of privacy to be smuggled 
into the law of defamation and others into other causes of action, all in a piecemeal fashion, 
we are most likely to delay the coming into being of a coherent and principled body of law 
pertaining to the protection of privacy. We also encourage the perpetuation of injustices: for 
the fragmentariness of the protection, making it virtually impossible to treat like cases alike, 
will have the almost unavoidable effect of adding to, rather than subtracting from, the 
injustice of not granting principled protection to this interest in the first place.  
 Some consequences might be more direct. Let us take as an illustration the publication 
to the world at large of the serological status of an HIV+ person. I will leave open the 
question whether such disclosure without proper justification ought to be actionable. If we 
accept that it should be, the real reason is unquestionably because we consider that it violates 
the right of the plaintiff to control the disclosure of such private information: what he has 
been robbed of in a case like that is the ability to decide for himself whether, when and to 
whom the information should be communicated. From this, it follows logically that it ought 
to be irrelevant whether the information is true. If the concern is privacy, truth should 
evidently be no defence: the wrong does not consist in the spreading of a false (and hurtful) 
statement; and is unaffected by it. If, on the other hand, we frame the claim as an action in 
                                                 
23
 On what the author has called ‘the interest in an equal measure of respect’ and the protection against 
harassment, see generally P. Birks, ‘Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect’, 32 Irish 
Jurist (NS) (1997), 1, esp. 28-44. 
  University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 2011/41
   
  
Page 7 of 12 
 
defamation, that is to say, as an action for the infringement of the plaintiff’s deserved 
reputation, then by construction truth should be a defence—for a true statement about another 
cannot possibly injure his deserved reputation.
24
 At this point, either of two things happens. 
Either truth is recognised as a defence, and the purpose of the action is defeated: the HIV+ 
claimant whose serological status has been broadcast to the world will be left without a 
remedy. Alternatively, something even more perverse might happen, which is that the law, 
unwilling to accept such a result, would make truth—simpliciter—irrelevant to the action in 
defamation.
25
 
 
[137] The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
 
This is what happened in England with the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, which prohibited 
the defendant having—maliciously—published the past, now spent, convictions of the 
claimant from relying on the defence of justification.
26
 If this happens, then the protection of 
the claimant is—rightly or wrongly—secured; but this comes at a heavy price, which is a 
severe distortion of the law of defamation. If defamation does, as it claims to (and should), 
protect deserved reputation and nothing but it, then it follows as a matter of logic that a true 
statement cannot be—and should not be—actionable in defamation. 
 
V Defamation and Economic Interests: the Case of Slanders not Actionable per se 
 
The third point requires us to step back in time to be understood. Originally, defamation in 
England was the province of ecclesiastical courts; it was actionable because it was sinful; and 
                                                 
24
 On the rationale of the defence of truth in terms of protected interests, see E. Descheemaeker, ‘ 
“Veritas non est defamatio”? Truth as a Defence in the Law of Defamation’, 31 Legal Studies (2011), part III. 
25
 This is the law for example in South Africa, where only truth ‘for the public benefit’ justifies. On the 
origins of the defence, and how it reflects the fact that South Africa really has a law of verbal injuries (iniuriae 
verbis) rather than of defamation, see E. Descheemaeker, ‘ “A man of bad character has not so much to lose”: 
Truth as a Defence in the South African Law of Defamation’ (forthcoming). On the position of Scots law, which 
adopted the English rule in 1859 (McKellar v Duke of Sutherland (1859) 21 D 222, 227), see J. Blackie, 
‘Defamation’ in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History of Private Law in Scotland, vol. 2: Obligations 
(Oxford, 2000), 633, 666-71. 
26
 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (1974 c 53), s. 8(5): ‘A defendant in any such action [= defamation 
action] shall not ... be entitled to rely upon the defence of justification if the publication is proved to have been 
made with malice’. The term ‘malice’ is not defined by the Act; but Lord Diplock (who introduced the word in 
the Bill) made it clear during the preparatory works that he meant it in the sense defined by himself earlier that 
year in Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135, 149 (HL Deb 24 July 1974 vol 353 cc1806-52 at 1812). This is the 
only exception known of English law to the principle that veritas diffamationis excusat. 
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the main remedy was excommunication of the defamer.
27
 No money damages were, at least 
in theory, granted by the church courts.
28
 
 It is only at the beginning of the 16
th
 century that the king’s courts started to grant 
redress for defamatory words. In order to justify their separate jurisdiction, parallel to that of 
ecclesiastical courts, the courts of common law insisted on the allegation of ‘temporal’ loss to 
the plaintiff. This ‘temporal loss’—never clearly defined—appears to have been essentially 
financial loss, caused by the injury to reputation but distinct from it.
29
 This is highly 
significant, because it means that, analytically, the common law of defamation was originally 
geared towards the protection of economic interests rather than reputation per se.
30
 The 
paradigmatic case of defamation in the 16
th
 or 17
th
 century would have been a merchant who 
had been publically called a ‘crook’ in the marketplace, as a result of which he claimed to 
have lost customers and sought redress. What we have here is an injury to reputation, which 
is essentially ignored by the law, and then an injury to economic interests which is 
consequential upon the injury to reputation and receives monetary redress through the action 
for defamation.  
 Crucially, however, the allegation of temporal loss soon became non-traversable, 
meaning that such loss was conclusively presumed to have flown from the publication of the 
words.
31
 But this rule only applied to the words which were actionable at the time it was 
developed. These comprised written words (the category known today as ‘libel’) and such 
spoken words as had been held to be actionable, of which the main categories were: (a) the 
allegation of a serious crime; (b) words affecting the plaintiff in his trade or profession 
(typically imputations of professional incompetence or allegations of bankruptcy); and (c) 
words imputing a disease regarded as shameful, such as leprosy or syphilis. It is only in the 
early 17
th
 century that other defamatory, spoken words became actionable under the action of 
trespass upon the case for words (slander). By that time, however, courts were no longer 
[138] content to presume the existence of temporal loss and started to probe into the 
allegations made by the claimant. As a result, if no ‘temporal’ loss was in fact proved, the 
words would yield no remedy—32 despite having, by definition, injured the reputation of the 
                                                 
27
 R. H. Helmholz, Select Cases on Defamation to 1600 (London, 1985), xxxviii. 
28
 Ibid., xxxix. 
29
 PR, 613. It is the precursor of what we would call ‘special loss’ today. 
30
 This caused Pollock to hold—rightly—that English law ‘has gone wrong from the beginning in 
making the damage and not the insult the cause of action’ (F. Pollock, The Law of Torts (London, 1887), 210). 
31
 D. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford, 1999), 116; PR, 613. 
32
 D. Ibbetson, op. cit. (n. 31), 123. 
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claimant. This is how the category known today as ‘slanders not actionable per se’ came into 
existence. The remarkable feature of this class for our purpose is that the defamatory words 
are unactionable unless and until the injury to reputation that they cause is accompanied by 
another type of loss. Loath as the law might be to admit this point, what this really means is 
that slander—defamation in a non-permanent form—does not in such ordinary cases protect 
reputation at all. It only protects (if through the mediation of defamatory words) the interests 
whose violation is redressed through the award of damages for consequential losses, in 
particular wealth.
33
 Given the above proposition, taken as a starting point, that what the 
wrong of defamation exists for is the protection of reputation, this result is evidently absurd. 
The regime of this class of slanders ought to be aligned on that of libel—defamation in a 
permanent form—and slanders actionable per se. Defamation should exist for itself, as a way 
of remedying injuries to reputation (a type of personality rights), not as an auxiliary of the 
law of negligence to protect the financial interests of the plaintiff. 
 
VI Defamation and Parasitic Interests: the Question of Consequential Loss 
 
This proposition—that defamation exists, as a cause of action, to remedy injuries to 
reputation, and not as an auxiliary of other causes of action to protect economic interests—
has another important consequence when it comes to the redress of consequential losses. The 
position in English law is currently that, once injury to the interest or interests primarily 
protected by a cause of action has been established—in the case of defamation, the injury to 
reputation—then (subject to the rules of remoteness) all other actionable losses flowing from 
it are recoverable as well, in particular financial losses. Thus, if I am publicly defamed and, 
as a result, suffer mental distress and also lose my job, I can obtain redress for these as well 
in defamation. Although the question is typically left unanalysed, its being regarded as 
coming to quantum of damages for the injury to reputation, what it really means it that the 
wrong of defamation also protects, obliquely, the corresponding interests (mental well-being 
and wealth).
34
  
 This can be contrasted with the position of Roman law, as still visible in modern 
South African law. In South Africa, if I lose my job as a result of being defamed, I will need–
at least in principle–to bring the actio iniuriarum to recover for the injury to my reputation 
                                                 
33
 PR, 616-17. 
34
 PR, 615-16. 
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and a separate action, the actio legis aquiliae, to recover for the economic loss. This I believe 
to be a much more satisfactory approach from an analytical perspective, and also 
practically.
35
 The reasons are similar to those expounded in section 3. The protection of 
various interests respond to different considerations, which often will translate into different 
rules pertaining to the redress of each of them. In English law, the recovery of economic loss, 
as a primary harm (‘pure economic loss’), is severely limited—and rightly so. The recovery 
of mere emotional distress is normally impossible when it is the sole injury complained of. 
Why should recovery widen, or become possible in the first place, simply because the losses 
happen to stem from an injury to reputation? The distinction is arbitrary, and the result unfair: 
if there are good reasons to stop or limit the redress of such injuries in the law of wrongs, 
these ought not to be bypassed simply by categorising the losses as ‘consequential’ rather 
than ‘pure’—a change of label which does not in itself justify anything;36 if there are not, the 
law should be changed rather than piecemeal exceptions allowed to be smuggled in.  
 [139] The alternative is the same as above: either the parasitic interests do not deserve 
protection, and they should not be able to act as free riders; or they do, in which case the law 
should develop a coherent body of rules to ensure their protection. Besides, as pointed out 
earlier, rules appropriate to one type of loss need not be appropriate for the redress of another. 
This is particularly true when it comes to the degree of fault required to trigger the award of a 
remedy. In this respect, it is intuitive that injuries to reputation and injuries to economic 
interests need not, and oftentimes should not, attract the same standard of liability. A legal 
system like South African law is equipped to deal with this: the actio iniuriarum brought to 
redress injuries—among others—to reputation will require the proof of animus iniuriandi; 
while the actio legis aquiliae brought to seek compensation for consequential economic loss 
will be based on negligence (culpa). The English law of defamation, on the other hand, is not 
so equipped. Conflating these various interests under one cause of action, it will either make 
the recovery of one type of loss too easy, or conversely too difficult, by aligning it without 
                                                 
35
 Interestingly, the same approach has been advocated in the context of Scots law: see K. Norrie, ‘The 
Scots Law of Defamation; Is there a Need for Reform?’, in N. Whitty and R. Zimmermann (eds.), Rights of 
Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (Dundee, 2009), chap 9. 
36
 This was recognised scathingly, in a different context, by Lord Devlin: ‘The interposition of the 
physical injury is said to make a difference of principle. I can find neither logic nor common sense in this. If 
irrespective of contract, a doctor negligently advises a patient that he can safely pursue his occupation and he 
cannot and the patient’s health suffers and he loses his livelihood, the patient has a remedy. But if the doctor 
negligently advises him that he cannot safely pursue his occupation when in fact he can and he loses his 
livelihood, there is said to be no remedy. Unless, of course, the patient was a private patient and the doctor 
accepted half a guinea for his trouble: then the patient can recover all. I am bound to say, my Lords, that I think 
this to be nonsense’ (Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, 517). 
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warrant on that of another—for example, the defamed plaintiff in a non-privileged situation 
will be able to recover for loss of earnings without any proof of fault at all, when typically 
such economic loss would require the proof of either dolus or culpa within a special 
relationship marked by an assumption of responsibility—or, alternatively, it will try to satisfy 
two sets of requirements at one time and thus end up in confusion. This, arguably, is what has 
happened to English law. One principal reason, in my mind, why the English law of 
defamation has been wavering for more than a century between malice-based, strict and 
negligence-based liability, without ever managing to reach a stable point,
37
 is because it is 
trying to protect at one time interests which naturally attract different responses in terms of 
fault. Forced to lump them together and subject them to the same rules, it was almost bound 
to reach unsatisfactory results, and likely to keep changing its mind in an attempt to reach an 
impossible compromise—which it did. In order to remedy this, English law should stop 
granting, in defamation as elsewhere, stealthy redress for injuries to parasitic interests under 
the guise of quantum of damages for consequential losses. These losses should, if warranted 
(and only then), be redressed through appropriate alternative causes of action. 
 
 
VII Conclusion  
 
This paper has defended four propositions which, it was argued, flow directly (as a matter of 
logic, not opinion) from the recognition that the wrong of defamation protects reputation—
deserved reputation—and nothing but it. This means that it ought not to protect obliquely 
privacy, self-esteem or other interests (in particular economic). For this reason, the 
supplementary tests of ridicule and ‘shun and avoid’ as to what constitutes defamatory matter 
ought to be removed from the law—which could be done judicially. Section 8(5) of the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act should also be abolished, which naturally would require 
Parliamentary intervention. The alignment of slanders not currently actionable per se on other 
defamatory statements would probably also require such intervention. The proposed reform 
would then pave the way to the abolition of the continuing distinction between libel and 
slander, which is no longer defended by anyone but has persisted to the present day. Finally, 
perhaps the most controversial proposition is the one pertaining to consequential losses, 
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which goes beyond defamation and would require a change in the way we think about the 
law: what it calls for is that the question of protected interests should finally, 250 years after 
Blackstone, be taken seriously and given, by English courts and scholars, the legal translation 
that they require and deserve. 
 
